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Narrative Environmental Ethics, Nature Writing, and Ecological 
Science as Tradition: Towards a Sponsoring  
Ground of Concern 
John Charles Ryan 
Edith Cowan University 
 
Over the last 30 years, environmental philosophers and ecological researchers have turned their attention to the 
possibilities of narratives: the stories people tell about their lives in conjunction with the human and non-human 
agents they live with. An interest in narrative environmental ethics reflects a re-evaluation of canonical 
ecophilosophical texts. Works such as Paul W. Taylor’s Respect for Nature suggest an essentialist view of 
environmental ethics in which predetermined principles are imposed on places and situations. On the other hand, 
Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac combines first-person prose with science-based explanations of the “biotic 
pyramid” towards the development of a land ethic. Examples, such as Leopold’s, of narrative ethics are thought to 
offer relational, place-based, non-authoritative, and non-anthropocentric models. This article examines three critical 
components of environmental narratives: self, context, and tradition. In order for environmental narratives to 
advance ecological ethics, they must be accompanied by the tradition of natural science (geology, ecology, and 
evolution) to provide the “sponsoring ground” for ethical concern and action. The role of natural science as a 
tradition—and indeed one of many—in narrative ethics provides the basis for ecological selfhood in the context of 
place. These assertions will be supported by an analysis of the environmental narratives of Karen Warren and Jim 
Cheney. However, in the temporally expansive and ecologically conscious poetic narratives of John Kinsella we 
find an environmental ethics deeply rooted in the material realities of place. 
Keywords: narratives, ecopoetics, environmental ethics, ecological science  
1. Introduction: Environmental Narratives, Ethics, and Ecopoetics 
Over the last 30 years, environmental philosophers and ecological researchers have debated the potential 
of narratives for generating “relational ethics” (Ellis 2007), place-based ethics (Friskics 2003), and 
non-anthropocentric models of ecological intervention (see Cheney 1987; Warren 1993; Preston 2001; 
Robertson et al. 2001; Liszka 2003; Slicer 2003). Advocates argue that narrative models help to redress the 
limitations of ethical paradigms that impose moral principles ex situ upon places, peoples, and cultures. The 
imposition of moral principles constitutes what Scott Friskics calls a “preoccupation with establishing clearly 
defined boundaries which will circumscribe and delimit the territory of our ethical concern” (2003, 29). 
According to Friskics, some seminal works in environmental philosophy, such as Paul W. Taylor’s Respect for 
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Nature (1986), apply conceptual constructs to environmental experiences and situations. In contrast to 
predetermined frameworks, narrative ethics are thought to offer local, relational, and situational positions 
derived from the contexts which generated—or were generated by—the crises in the first place. For Friskics 
environmental narratives entail personal engagement with ecological issues and “speak of the sponsoring 
ground of my concern [and] define the context of my ethical deliberations” (2003, 11). A narrative ethics, 
therefore, is presumed to reflect more sensitively the personal and geographical milieus in which and for which 
deliberations occur. In this article, I ask, “can narrative serve as a basis for an appropriate environmental 
ethics?”. By “appropriate” I mean frameworks that support behavioral, social, and political paradigms that do 
not undergird the environment’s denigration. As a way of specifying how narrative approaches work, 
environmental writing—prose nature writing and ecopoetry—will feature in this article, including the recent 
poetic narratives of Western Australian writer John Kinsella, the first-person accounts of environmental 
philosopher Karen Warren in the 1990s, and the third-person writings of bioregionalist Jim Cheney in the 1980s.  
“Narrative” refers to a “story” in the broadest sense. For the purposes of this article, a narrative can be 
defined, using Chris Barker’s notion, as “a sequential account or purported record of events ordered across time 
into a plot. The concept of narrative refers to the form, pattern or structure by which stories are constructed and 
told” (2008, 483). Arthur Bochner defines narratives simply as “stories people tell about their lives” (qtd. in 
Adams 2008, 176). Tony Adams argues that “narratives help us make sense of life, and in the telling of stories, 
we abide by storying conventions such as the use of common storylines, linear or chaotic temporal sequences, 
and writing within/against genres” (2008, 176). Ecosystem health researchers furthermore characterize 
environmental narrative as “oral environmental histories and other anecdotal sources of knowledge and 
perceptions that are bounded by the narrator’s experiences, observations, and attachment to place” (Robertson 
et al. 2001, abstract). Additionally, in his narrative analysis of the American conservationist Aldo Leopold’s 
classic environmental text A Sand County Almanac (1949), James Liszka contends that “narratives do have an 
argumentative force, [one which is] more rhetorical than logical” (2003, 45). Moreover, for Liszka, “a story is 
often more profoundly persuasive than argument alone, since it addresses the whole person, that is, in addition 
to logical proofs and explanations” (2003, 46). For many environmental philosophers, A Sand County Almanac 
is emblematic of an environmental narrative insofar as it fuses Leopold’s first-person prose with logical 
explanations of the “biotic pyramid” (Liszka 2003, 53) towards the development of a “land ethic” (Leopold 
1949, 167-90). Reflecting on Leopold’s work and other stories of conservation, Deborah Slicer observes that 
environmental narratives require “the attentive reader to grapple, imaginatively, with intellectually and 
emotionally bewildering choices” (2003, 2). Narratives, according to Slicer who cites in full Joy Harjo’s prose 
poem “Wolf Warrior,” engage our “emotional, intelligence, empathetic and poetic imagination” (2003, 3).  
Despite the apparently obvious merits of narrative for environmental practice and thought, Slicer goes on 
to ask: “Should environmental philosophers pay attention to narratives because they contain certain truths that 
are only possible through story and because stories elicit practical wisdom? Should philosophers be writing 
such narratives?” (2003, 2). This article responds to her questions by examining three critical components of 
narrative: self, context, and tradition. Part 1 argues that the unity of the narrative—expressed through the 
contextualization of selfhood in place, the capacity of the self to address epistemological crises, and the 
emotional capacity of one’s narrative voice to persuade—contributes to ethical deliberation by making explicit 
our evaluative processes. Part 1 advocates the ecologically resonant dimension of self—particularly evident in 
the work of Leopold and Kinsella—as a basis for a narrative ethics. Part 2 suggests that the emancipation of 
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environmental discourse from predetermination occurs through the grounding of an ethics in narrative context. 
Hence, narrative context provides the “sponsoring ground” (Friskics 2003, 11) for ethical deliberation. The 
personal and community capacity to articulate and act on moral concerns derives from this grounding in 
narrative context (Friskics 2003, 14-19). However, the situating of an environmental ethics in a milieu, such as 
Montana’s Rocky Mountain Front, is complicated by (1) the retrospective nature of narrative; (2) the problem 
of negotiating between rival narratives; and (3) the difficulty of determining what constitutes an appropriate 
context. Part 3 addresses the question of narrative traditions and argues that an appropriate narrative tradition is 
critical to an environmental ethics. Towards a conclusion, Part 4 draws from the concepts of self, context, and 
tradition to argue that narrative ethics can advance contemporary environmental thinking only in conjunction 
with the narrative of natural science—including geography, ecology, and evolution. Selfhood, as such, becomes 
rooted in the socioecological demands of time, space, and place—those constitutive elements of narrative.  
More specifically, in arguing for the ethical importance of environmental stories and the conjunction of 
self, context, and tradition in constructing those stories, this article will examine the potential of ecopoetics to 
provide narratives through the example The New Arcadia (2005). This collection by Western Australian writer 
and critic John Kinsella is crucial because it exemplifies the interplay of ecopoetics and narrative environmental 
ethics. In the essay “The Language Habitat: An Ecopoetry Manifesto,” James Engelhardt describes ecopoetry as 
intrinsically engaging ethical questions: “The ecopoem is connected to the world, and this implies responsibility. 
Like other poetic models that assume a connection and engagement (feminism, Marxism, witness, etc.), ecopoetry 
is surrounded by questions of ethics” (2007, para. 5). Moreover, poets Forrest Gander and Kinsella are 
interested in how the narrative structure of an ecopoem can help to define an environmental ethics: “Aside from 
issues of theme and reference, how might syntax, line break, or the shape of the poem on the page express an 
ecological ethics” (Gander and Kinsella 2012, 2). Divided into five “acts,” The New Arcadia bears—with 
ecological urgency—Barker’s notion of narrative as the “form, pattern or structure by which stories are 
constructed and told” (Barker 2008, 483). Importantly, Kinsella’s poetic narratives link moral awareness to 
ecological science and phenomenological engagement. For Kinsella, aspects of self (experience in and of the 
environment), context (the ecosystem breakdown of the Wheatbelt of Western Australia through inappropriate 
farming practices), and tradition (inclusively poetic, aesthetic, and ecological) are unifying themes that, when 
taken together, produce a narrative environmental ethics deeply rooted in place.  
2. The Unity (and Disunity) of Self through Context, Epistemology, and Voice 
The ensuing discussion of contextualization of self begins with Alisdair MacIntyre’s communitarian ethics, 
which insist upon the central significance of narrative to moral thought as a rejection of absolutist subjectivity. 
MacIntyre explains: “In successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we always 
move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the 
individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer” (1981, 197). In other words, one action 
or episode becomes intelligible through a logical association with a history of subjects. In MacIntyre’s view, such 
context generates the action, the body of conclusions, and the expectations towards which the action progresses. 
MacIntyre reveals two conditions of the narrative self: “One is subject to the peculiarities of one’s own history 
and the narrative of any life is part of an interlocking set of narratives” (1981, 203). On the one hand, the latter 
condition alludes to the correlative aspect of selfhood; I am accountable for (or at least witness to) the chain of 
events that constitute my narrative and these events are verifiable by others apprehending my story. On the 
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other hand, the former condition maintains selfhood as a personally unique narrative spanning one’s life, but 
constrained—“interlocking”—as part of many narratives. MacIntyre concludes that the unity of a life is the 
unity of a narrative of a single life. Characteristic of the narrative is the reassessment of events to make them 
both ever-expanding yet more coherent components of one’s narrative.  
Hence, the unity of a narrative is the re-evaluation of the one’s circumstances in a constant movement to 
correlate seems and is, that is, appearance (e.g., potential negative impacts on self and the environment) and 
reality (e.g., actual negative impacts on self and the environment). Where there is discrepancy between seems 
and is, a crisis of narrative epistemology occurs. In simple terms, our ways of knowing and how we apply 
knowledge to life circumstances do not match. The resolution of epistemological crises and the creation of new 
responses depend on narratives to make intelligible the reasons for our crises or to rationalize the breakdown of 
our belief systems. Hence, a narrative can enable a re-evaluative response to such crises: “When an 
epistemological crisis is resolved, it is by the construction of a narrative which enables the agent to understand 
both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he or she could have been so 
drastically misled by them” (MacIntyre 1977, 455). The posterior faculty of narrative, thereby, enables a means 
of recovery and reorientation when our belief base fails to provide reasonable outcomes—those that are 
extensible from our understandings of the world and self.  
This aptitude of narrative for resolution during phases of epistemological crises is exemplified in Karen 
Warren’s first-person rock-climbing narrative. The initial paradigm through which the speaker relates to the 
rock is one of “intense determination, using whatever strength and skills I had to accomplish this challenging 
feat” (Warren 1993, 327). However, by midpoint up the rock face, the narrator complains of exhaustion and 
anxiety as she fails to grasp certain holds and hangs dangling in midair. She regroups and again focuses 
determination, confidence, and concentration, eventually reaching the top of the climb. Knowing that her focus 
on intense determination and skill deployment nearly prevented her ascent on the first day, she re-evaluates her 
convictions and methods. She goes on to adopt an attitude of care and gratitude on the second day of climbing: 
“Gone was the determination to conquer the rock, to forcefully impose my will on it; I wanted simply to work 
respectfully with the rock as I climbed” (1993, 328). The narrative encompasses her whole process, her 
“experiences, observations, and attachment to place” (Robertson et al. 2001, abstract), including the story of her 
two-day ordeal, the climbing style she rejected and the one she went on to adopt. As a unified medium 
providing “a sequential account or purported record of events ordered across time” (Barker 2008, 483), the 
complete account of her rock-climbing compels us because—through its storyline—it emphasizes the ethical 
stance adopted of the second day, which effectively guided her actions in the environment. Moreover, the 
narrator’s voice changes distinctly between the two days of climbing. Warren argues that the centralization of 
voice enables the expression of a range of situational behaviors, convictions, values, and attitudes. These are 
often relegated to the margins through essentialist theories of ethics. A voice as an amalgamation of the 
“historical, material, and social realities in which moral subjects find themselves” (Warren 1993, 329) brings 
human experience to ethical discourse. As evident in the rock-climbing narrative, voice brings forth an 
emotional response to the natural world, one which can go unregistered in ethical theory or managerialist 
perspectives of the environment. In sum, Warren’s voice expresses a range of emotional states beginning with 
frustration and fear on the first day to gratitude and awe on the second.  
Yet despite its presentation of the power of voice as an ethical beacon, Warren’s narrative has been 
criticized for its marginalization of dimensions of self, particularly in reference to feminist claims for the twin 
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domination of women and nature. Phillip Payne offers two ways Warren’s imperative for first-person narrative 
can be interpreted. The first, the “historical self,” relates to the historical, social, and material identities of self. 
The second, the “social self,” is positioned in a temporal, spatial, and symbolic flux that amplifies the historical 
self. Payne claims that Warren’s historical self privileges the subjectivity of the “felt” part of the experience, 
thereby marginalizing important contextual meanings of the social self. Payne suggests that “Warren’s 
historical self reproduces the subject/object, mind/body, agency/structure dichotomies she is so rightly 
concerned about, thus usurping the suggestiveness of her ethical conclusions emerging from grounded 
experience in ethical deliberation” (1994, 142). In other words, text and context are bifurcated in Warren’s 
narrative. The contexts that need amplification in Payne’s view are the historical, social, and material realities 
of rock-climbing and more, generally, the social self related to the tradition of leisure. Rock-climbing, in 
particular, has been customarily associated with white male participation; an ethos of domination over nature; 
the social and economic capital of sophisticated technologies and gear; the escapism of wilderness pilgrimages; 
and the trivialization of local and urban environments. Moreover, Warren’s narrative fails to acknowledge the 
tradition of conqueror intrinsic to the practice of rock-climbing. By recontextualizing Warren’s narrative in 
socio-environmental life world of rock-climbing and leisure, Payne brings the metanarrative of the twin 
dominations of women and nature to prominence and strengthens the moral subject’s accountability to the 
broader contexts in which she operates.  
A strength of narrative for forwarding environmental ethics resides in its expression of a unified self. 
Beginning with MacIntyre’s contextualized self as a mode of negotiating epistemological crises, we see how 
narrative can make intelligible human actions within a context (a place, a bioregion, a rock face). However, a 
crisis ensues when our approaches fail to correspond to our worldviews. The capacity of narrative for the 
re-evaluation of such crises presents the possibility of an adaptable and intelligible environmental ethics. 
Moreover, a first-person narrative centralizes the voice of the moral agent. As such, emotional expression 
infuses the cold, hard objectivity of an ethical position, as shown by Warren’s rock-climbing story. Yet, as 
Payne suggests, critical dimensions of self and context can be minimized in narratives. This diminishes the 
ethical integrity of the narrative in confronting broader socio-environmental contexts—such as the masculinist 
and bourgeoisie tradition of rock-climbing and the unannounced role of the ecology of the rock face in the 
narrative—in which human actions take place.  
3. The Grounding of Ethical Decision-Making in Context 
The contextualization of selfhood is a critical component of a narrative ethics. If the self is contextualized 
reflexively in the natural history of a place and in the tradition of human activity such as rock-climbing, then 
the ethic can reflect the circumstances of the moral agent’s story and setting. Thereby, the narrative can make 
possible the release of ethics from predetermination through the contextualization of discourse. MacIntyre 
emphasizes the significance of the circumstances and moral context that make decisions intelligible (Horton 
and Mendus 1994, 9). Theorists of narrative environmental ethics concur with MacIntyre’s insistence on moral 
context. For example, Cheney describes the perils of abstracting concepts and theories from their paradigm 
settings and applying them elsewhere: “Although these abstractions are fully intelligible only within the 
paradigm settings which gave birth to them, such abstractions can achieve a life of their own; they can be 
articulated in accordance with canons of coherence and made into apparently self-contained wholes ready for 
export and application to a variety of settings” (1989, 121; italics added). In Cheney’s view, since narratives 
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embed an understanding of self in the world, the best stories we can tell are those which offer bioregional and 
situational truths, rather than universal and exportable principles. Cheney continues: “To contextualize ethical 
deliberation is, in some sense, to provide a narrative or story, from which the solution to the ethical dilemma 
emerges as the fitting conclusion” (1987, 145). A bioregional orientation holds that narrative and context should 
extend outward from human communities to encompass non-human communities. Through the grounding of 
narratives in bioregions, a non-anthropocentric form of selfhood can emerge. Moreover, bioregional realities 
moderate the need for constant re-contextualization of ethical principles once exported (Cheney 1987, 128).  
The significance of narrative in ethical discourse is also argued for by Holmes Rolston III: “An 
environmental ethic does not want to abstract out universals, if such there are, from all this drama of life, 
formulating some set of duties applicable across the whole…. Ethics must be written in theory with universal 
intent, but the theory must permit and require ethics to be lived in practice in the first person singular” (Rolston 
1986, 10). Similarly, Warren describes the power of first-person narratives for conceptualizing ethical meanings. 
Ethical models emerge out of the particular situations moral agents find themselves; they are not imposed on 
situations and places as the extension of a predetermined principle (Warren 1993, 329).  
The narrative’s grounding in context enables a more forceful articulation of emergent ethical principles 
having tangible outcomes for an agent: a rock climber, a flower, or a large-scale system such as Montana’s 
Rocky Mountain Front. Cheney reflects on the indigenous Russian Ainu conception of fire as witness to the 
treatment of game. He observes that mythical images in narrative convey moral imperatives that instruct by 
delimiting the moral space that where we physically live (1989, 129). For Cheney, narratives weave together 
knowledge of place, health, and community. Narratives offer moral imperatives to the community with the 
argumentative power of reality and fact (Cheney 1989, 130) or, as Liszka comments, “narratives do have an 
argumentative force, [one which is] more rhetorical than logical” (2003, 45). Anthropological literature in 
particular reveals the reliance of traditional cultures on narratives for moral instruction. For instance, the lives 
of traditional Athapaskan Koyukon of northwest interior Alaska are guided by stories called “Distant Time,” in 
which moral imperatives assume the form of taboos governing the human interaction with the natural world. 
Anthropologist Richard Nelson comments:  
The narratives also provide an extensive code of proper behaviour toward the environment and its resources. They contain 
many episodes showing that certain kinds of actions toward nature can have bad consequences, and these are taken as 
guidelines to follow today. Stories therefore serve as a medium for instructing young people in the traditional code and as 
an infallible standard of conduct for everyone. (1983, 18) 
These kinds of narrative moral imperatives—place-bound ethical instructions with practical implications 
for material and spiritual realms—have been incorporated into a postmodern environmental paradigms where 
local milieu is linked the ethical principles (Cheney 1989, 130). 
While narratives might offer an appealing call to ecofeminist sensibilities, certain critiques have been 
levelled at the role of context. Some theorists maintain the Sartrean position that, since a narrative can only be 
comprehensible in retrospect, it must present a falsified account of life (Johnson 1994, 57). Such criticism of 
the retrospective quality of narrative suggests that the reader’s grappling “imaginatively, with intellectually and 
emotionally bewildering choices” (Slicer 2003, 2) can stall decision-making processes. Critics of narrative 
argue that the immediate context (i.e., the Wheatbelt region of Western Australia) can be distanced temporally 
from the moral agent (i.e., the poet), thus making difficult the production of real outcomes through a narrative 
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environmental ethics. Since the appropriate decision comes after considering the “interlocking set of narratives” 
(MacIntyre 1981, 203), the unique circumstances of the decision-making moment are lost to the more 
contemplative or reflective aspects of narrative. Context could be lost here. The quickly passing dimensions of 
the decision-making process fade as the moral agents consider past and future. Surely the strength of narrative 
is that it offers a context reflexive and sensitive to moral agents. Instead of abstracting out universalized 
principles and imposing them on situations calling for ethical intervention, the narrative internally generates an 
ethic most fitting the peculiarities of the setting and the self. Since a narrative ethic reflects the milieu, it most 
convincingly can convey moral imperatives with practical implications for the human and non-human agents 
involved. However, questions include how to select and emphasize one context within many contexts (for 
example, ecological contexts over social or historical realities). The choice of context is an important variable 
in a narrative ethics. How do we evaluate rival narratives?  
4. The Question of Traditions  
MacIntyre characterizes a tradition as an ongoing negotiation which requires frequent examination in 
addressing epistemological realities. According to MacIntyre, one of the signs of a tradition in crisis is that 
accepted methods for convening seems and is begin to fall apart (1977, 459). Therefore, a central aspect of 
tradition involves epistemological debate: “A tradition then not only embodies the narrative of an argument, but 
is only to be recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other 
argumentative retellings” (1977, 461). The objective should be a more intelligible historical narrative than 
previously held. In MacIntyre’s view, this renegotiation occurs during periods when crises of epistemology 
challenge an expectation of outcome.  
Traditions, then, characterize the efficacy of our ethical-decision making. If we invoke an inappropriate 
tradition where a discrepancy between seems and is lingers (e.g., the rock face is represented as a mere surface 
for human recreation rather than a fragile ecosystem in its own right), then the resultant ethic will too be 
fragmented. The tradition here is of natural science. In illuminating the role of tradition in narrative ethics, 
consider the concept of nature as conversational partner. With an empiricist view of nature, is it appropriate to 
conceive of narratives as mediums through which nature speaks to us? Posited by Christopher Preston, this 
critique recognizes that the metaphor of conversing with the environment lacks sense without an animistic 
tradition of nature. Along with Cheney, Donna Haraway employs this metaphor to further an argument for 
partiality, objectivity, and situated knowledge: “Perhaps our hopes for accountability, for politics, for ecofeminism, 
turns on revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must learn to converse” (1988, 597). Cheney 
and Haraway agree on a model of nature’s agency that frames the inquirer as a conversational partner. This 
tradition is derived from accounts of Native American spirituality on which ecological thinkers have relied for 
30 years for ethical frameworks (See J. Baird Callicott’s 1982 article for a Romantic point of view).  
Yet, this appropriation of a characteristically Native American worldview is probably not the most suitable 
for a postmodern account of nature’s agency. Preston comments: “Without a metaphysic that acknowledges 
personhood to nature, and there is nothing in postmodernism to suggest that rocks are actually persons, the idea 
of inquiry as a form of conversation appears to be a difficult one to make sense of” (2000, 231-32). Nature as 
conversational partner is comprehensible within the tradition of Native American spirituality, but the 
exportation of this animistic account of nature to contemporary settings may be counterproductive to yielding 
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an appropriate environmental ethic. Cheney and Haraway’s adoption of the paradigm of nature as conversational 
partner seems to work against their insistence on context, situated knowledge, and bioregional imagination. 
Mick Smith observes of Cheney’s presumably postmodern bioregional and Indigenous narrative: 
It is foundationalist insofar as it makes bioregions the necessary grounds for all the properly contextual discourse. It is 
colonizing to the extent that it appears in an international journal written in English, the most widespread colonial language. 
It is essentializing in its conception of all modernism as inherently divorced from place and totalizing in its pretension to 
provide a universal human history. (2001, 8-9) 
Tradition here is critical. The selection of an inappropriate tradition can impoverish ethical decision-making 
by distorting contexts and notions of selfhood. Ecofeminist inclusion of Indigenous traditions in postmodern 
discourse—as an attempt at dissolving essentialization and bringing context to ethical deliberation—conflates 
two potentially divergent value systems: postmodern and Indigenous.  
What tradition should be invoked, then, to give birth to new narratives of the natural world? Preston 
argues that an ecological and evolutionary tradition is a useful way to inform narratives. Following MacIntyre’s 
characterization of a tradition as an extended historical argument embedded in social context, Preston regards 
ecology and evolution as appropriate traditions for the contextually informed environmental negotiations. 
Furthermore, according to Preston, ecological and (debatably) evolutionary traditions are non-hierarchical. 
Ecology in particular is non-anthropocentric in its emphasis on biological and geological material realities that 
define environments: 
What is distinctive about the ecological and evolutionary tradition when compared to many of the contexts typically called 
upon to bring normativity to narratives is that it draws on accounts of material and biological structures to supplement the 
social structures which usually dominate our narratives…. Including accounts of ecological and evolutionary nature in our 
narratives is desirable, then, both because it demands from us accountability to material reality and because it grounds our 
environmental norms. (Preston 2001, 252-53) 
The selection of an appropriate tradition is vital to the genesis of a viable narrative environmental ethic. 
MacIntyre’s concept of tradition as an argumentative retelling of narrative is applicable to models of 
environmental ethics where re-evaluation is key. Within the narrative, the selection of a tradition determines the 
correlation of expectation and outcome, of seems and is. This is especially evident in cases of environmental 
conflict where inappropriate traditions are imposed on human and non-human agents (see Friskics 2003). The 
appropriation of the Native American tradition of animism and the related adoption of the metaphor of nature as 
a conversational partner pose possible problems for an appropriate narrative model of environmental ethics. 
Preston’s call for ecological and evolutionary traditions as means for holding agents accountable to material 
and biological realities presents a compelling insight into what an appropriate environmental narrative might 
look like.  
5. Self, Context, and Tradition in a Narrative Ethic of Nature: Examples from Environmental 
Writing 
The preceding sections have examined the narrative themes of self, context, and tradition for their roles in 
helping to develop an environmental ethics. This article has argued for a unity of self in narrative. Unit of self is 
achieved through evaluative process where actions and choices are made intelligible and where voice is given 
an opportunity for emotional expression. The contextualization of ethical decision-making in narrative provides 
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the force for locally or bioregionally crafted deliberation. The inclusion of appropriate traditions—with emphasis 
on ecological and evolutionary narratives—is crucial to the creation of a narrative ethic of nature. The promise 
of a narrative ethic of the environment resides in its capacity to address local conditions and yield moral 
parameters reflective of the peculiarities of the environment in which the agent acts. In other words, by 
countering the essentializing tendency of a universalized and abstracted ethic, a narrative ethic gives voice to 
the moral agent. The narrative permits a reflective response—a self-correcting and reflexive rejoinder—which 
makes clear the follies of previous choices. Such a deliberative process renders context into an intelligible 
baseline from which ethical action can proceed. 
The concept of narrative resolves the lingering difficulty here, namely the question “which came first, the 
ethic or the environment?”. In other words, how can we judge if our actions within the environment merit their 
formulation into an ethical premise? Could it be that there is insufficient “ground” in narrative? There is no 
guarantee that a freely subjective construction of the natural world through narrative will not eradicate 
accountability to the material realities of an environment—a unique composition of geology, biology, and 
non-human agents. This article, therefore, argues that the unity of self and community in local context must be 
accompanied by the tradition of natural science (geology, ecology, and evolution) to provide the “sponsoring 
ground” (Friskics 2003, 11) of environmental ethics. Reference to ecological science ensures that the narrative 
ethic is, indeed, of the environment. The unified self of the agent—reflecting socio-environmental contexts 
within a tradition of natural science—can advance an environmental ethics. The re-evaluative capacity of 
narrative—exemplified by Warren’s trials and tribulations on the rock face—can lead to an ethic incorporating 
local knowledge as well as human and non-human voices. The prioritization of the natural science tradition in 
narrative ethics supports the unity of the ecological self. It frees ethical deliberation from questions of 
appropriate context.  
The discussion will now turn to two first-person narratives and consider them for their dimensions of self, 
context, and tradition. Here is a more complete passage from Warren: 
I closed my eyes and began to feel the rock with my hands –the cracks and crannies, the raised lichen and mosses, the 
almost imperceptible nubs that might provide a resting place for my fingers and toes when I began to climb. At that 
moment, I was bathed in serenity. I began to talk to the rock in an almost inaudible, child-like way, as if the rock were my 
friend. I felt an overwhelming sense of gratitude for what it offered me—a chance to know myself and the rock differently, 
to appreciate unforeseen miracles like the tiny flowers growing in the even tinier cracks in the rock’s surface, and to come 
to know a sense of being in relationship with the natural environment. (1994, 328) 
Now consider Preston’s sensuous counter-narrative to Warren’s rock-climbing episode: 
Now on one of the several islands in the middle of Rattlesnake Creek, I found myself immersed in a bustling community 
of both the biotic and abiotic. A kingfisher rattled noisily up stream to resume its water watching from a more comfortable 
distance. An osprey sat on a snag tearing at its still dripping prey, turning piscine protein into avian muscle. I could smell 
the profusion that is a subalpine springtime in the dense evening air. I felt it on my skin. It pressed against my ears and 
worked its way into my hair. I was surrounded by life stories and stories of life. (2001, 259) 
Despite their obvious appeal, there are inherent problems with both Warren and Preston’s representations 
of self. As discussed in Part 1, the coherency of one’s narrative pertains both to how it is understood by self and 
how others understand it. The narrative of a single life is part of an interlocking set of narratives, in MacIntyre’s 
terms. The circumstances of one’s story are intelligible when apprehended by self and community, in this case, 
by the reader. Simply put, we do not know enough about the speakers in both episodes. Therefore, their choices 
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are not as intelligible as they could be and any ethical stance resulting from these narratives would lack 
accountability to other narratives, traditions, and contexts. Moreover, both speakers do not adequately treat the 
social dimensions of self, particularly those metanarrative elements of rock-climbing and bicycling—the 
domination of nature, for example—those qualities, which, intentionally or not, express themselves as inherent 
realities of the chosen modes of engagement with nature. How can Warren and Preston assume that one and 
two-day recreational excursions offer sufficient time to develop a form of narrative in which the self is 
expressed adequately in relation to the cadences of place? In order for the self to achieve a higher order of unity, 
a broader temporal context is needed. Such a context would represent the socio-environmental realities of their 
activities and the ecological realities of their respective place as intrinsic to notions of self as rock climber or 
as bicyclist.  
In terms of context and tradition, Preston’s narrative better exemplifies the integration of natural 
science—the bustling community of the kingfisher and osprey, the life stories and stories of life—with his 
personal insights—the sensations of skin, ears, hair, and sight. He draws from the ecological tradition in 
describing the dripping prey. The remainder of his story is permeated with details of ecology and evolutionary 
references. The emerging ethic could be one which will encompass the awe and respect the speaker has for his 
tradition. Warren’s narrative, by contrast, is too anthropocentric to offer an appropriate environmental ethic. She 
represents nature as a backdrop for her felt experience. Though replete with details of the rock, the narrative 
divorces the rock from its environment and herself as moral agent. Ecology and evolution are obscured in favor 
of the speaker’s overwhelming emotional surges. The rock-climbing narrative does not hold the speaker 
accountable to the rock’s tradition as abiotic member of an ecosystem. The narrative tracks her evaluative 
responses but does not achieve a unity of self tied to context and tradition; natural science is marginalized. In 
simpler terms, Warren’s story puts the person first in the first-person, to the detriment of environment. 
The natural world must be recognized as an agent in environmental narratives. The selection of a tradition 
of natural science makes possible an active role and contextualizes the discourse surrounding the narrative. 
However, the self must also be recognized for its narrative importance. A unified self is one which engages 
reflection as a critical mode of ethics. This self-reflection within the context of natural science is crucial to an 
environmental ethic that emerges from narrative. Warren’s much heralded rock-climbing narrative does not 
exemplify the kind of narrative that facilitates environmental ethics, whereas Preston’s counter-narrative 
exhibits the commingling of nature (ecology and evolution) and first-person detail. His narrative offers the 
beginning of an ethic encompassing world and self. A narrative that heeds natural science (to include geography, 
ecology, and evolution) should also portray self grounded in socio-environmental realities and a broad temporal 
context. Simply, the narratives of Warren and Preston are too abbreviated and Romantic (and consequently 
underdeveloped) to offer ethical traction. Warren’s narrative is especially limited by its own first-person 
immediacy to acknowledge the environmental realities of natural science and social histories of the rock face. It 
is only by sufficiently and appropriately representing the intersection of nature and culture that narrative can 
offer an appropriate environmental ethics. 
To offer a counter-example to the limited narratives of Preston and Warren, the article will now conclude 
with the ecopoetry of Western Australian writer John Kinsella. The works of Kinsella (1963-), a prolific writer 
of over 35 collections of poetry and a literary critic who lives in the Wheatbelt east of Perth, Western Australia, 
can be conceived of, collectively and on a poem-by-poem basis, as environmental narratives with strong ethical 
underpinnings. His poetry displays an acute awareness of place and ecology. Kinsella’s work upsets the notion 
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of landscape as an idyllic recreational space where humans can commune with nature. The environments he 
writes of are deeply fragmented places polarized between people, flora, and fauna. In fact, Kinsella’s poetry has 
been self-characterized as “poison pastoralism” or “anti-pastoralism,” the latter a term proposed by literary 
critic Terry Gifford to denote the tension of “how to find a voice that does not lose sight of authentic 
connectedness with nature, in the process of exposing the language of the idyll” (1995, 55). Moreover, 
Kinsella’s narratives deploy knowledge of ecology and linguistic experimentation in response to the question of 
“how might syntax, line break, or the shape of the poem on the page express an ecological ethics?” (Gander and 
Kinsella 2012, 2). His ecopoetic approach is rooted in the regional ecological crisis of the Wheatbelt where 
close to 90% of the original (i.e., preceding European colonization) vegetation has been eradicated within 170 
years. The loss of indigenous tree cover has led to the catastrophic salination of the soil. Kinsella’s work 
reflects these material realities and is not circumscribed by mere speculative Romantic notions of human and 
non-human harmonies in the environment.  
Kinsella’s The New Arcadia (2005) is divided into five “acts.” Each act begins with a poem called 
“Reflectors,” each subtitled according to a sequence of drives. For example, there are the poems “Reflectors: 
Drive 1” (Kinsella 2005, 3-10) and “Reflector: Drive 2” (2005, 45-51). The “Reflectors” ensemble provides 
narrative cohesion to the collection and tracks the poet’s movements from the city of Perth to his rural home in 
the Wheatbelt. In particular, Kinsella’s poetry about the salination of the Wheatbelt provides some evidence of 
the environmental ethics emerging from his narratives. The poem “Salt is Part of the Environment” (2005, 171-72) 
is an acerbic commentary on the bureaucratic assumption that salt is merely part of the ecosystem. In fact, as 
Kinsella stresses, the salinity crisis has been brought about through human mismanagement of the Wheatbelt 
ecosystem, not the intrusion of salt per se:  
These places are often saline. 
It’s what demographers 
might call natural salt depression, 
the water table divulging itself 
within the fabric of plant growth, 
like bio-necessity. Clearing melaleucas 
and flooded gums, the big drinkers, 
it extends—naturally—up from recession 
into planar surfaces: paddocks, 
house yards, catching pens. (lines 9-18) 
Kinsella here alludes to the technical language of demographers. Terms like “natural salt depression” are 
part of the scientific discourse used to justify the occurrence of the salt infiltration that the poet observes to be 
out-of-control. However, the actual cause (invoking MacIntyre’s distinction between seems and is) of the 
salinity is the clearing of indigenous tree species, such as melaleucas and flooded gums that, with their deep 
roots, controlled the flow of salt to the topsoil. These kinds of trees were considered “big drinkers” by 
European colonists and were accordingly cleared to ensure a water supply for pastoral development of what 
would later become the Wheatbelt. The steady creeping of the salt through “paddocks/house yards, catching 
pens” occurs “naturally,” yet the natural world here has been deeply fractured by broad-scale devastation and 
absolute colonial blindness to the homeostasis existing between water, salt, soil, and roots. The emotions of an 
ecological self speak of the biotic context and its devastation: “the sunset cutting in like fear / or a reminder of 
loss” (lines 4-5). Kinsella laments: 





like the animals who inhabit  
these places. Condemned to trial 
by media, written up 
by the ‘all that glisters is not gold’ 
school of journalism. (lines 30-36) 
The “equation doesn’t balance” here refers to the failure of science and media to right the wrong of (and 
truthfully represent) the ecological devastation of the region. The flora and fauna of the Wheatbelt are 
peculiarly adapted to the biological constraints of the environment, yet this originary ecology has been 
fragmented and erased, replaced by ill-suited agricultural enterprise. This criticism of science recurs in the 
poem “Salt Semi-Ode” (2005, 172): 
critics research remnant bushland 
until seeds can no longer purchase sand, 
and science becomes art as poets 
build Sodom and Gomorrah, and visionary boats 
sail out on halcyon mirages, 
all colours played by crystals, 
shimmering blankness and wire-rust gauges, 
poverty and sadness as expansion stalls. (lines 5-12)  
For Kinsella, conservation science represents an inappropriate response that ultimately stalls the renewal 
of the vegetation and the holding back of the salinity. The poetic narrative picks up where the science cannot, 
representing the place for what it is, in all of its “poverty and sadness” and providing a platform for ethics to 
develop. The ecological (and ethical) self of Kinsella is a strong current throughout his salt poems. In “Salt is 
the Residue of Hauntings” (2005, 173), the sadness intensifies through reflection on the agricultural practices 
destroying the Wheatbelt ecosystem: “bulk handling ... a wealth of ectoplasm / exchanged for the bag count of 
lost years” (lines 22-23). Kinsella’s poetic narratives are firmly fixed in the context of the Wheatbelt; in the 
traditions of poetry, ecology, and Australian colonization; and in an ecological self immersed in its environment. 
Importantly, Kinsella’s ecopoetry suggests that a critical perspective of science as a tradition within a context is 
more important than uncritical engagement with ecology in narrative, as Preston’s excerpt demonstrated. Hence, 
understanding of ecological science, in critical conjunction with self and context, is crucial to the formation of a 
narrative ethics.  
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